EXHIBIT 7

In the Matter Of:

In Re - LTL Management LLC

JOHN KIM

June 01, 2023



17 1 J. KIM 2 Ο. Okav. Just to -- so we can move 3 on, would you agree that the value could have 4 been up to \$61 billion of the money? 5 No, I would say that the value Α. reasonably would have been, you know, at that 6 time, probably -- you know, the best 7 calculation would be somewhere -- what we 8 know is at that time, there was a settlement 9 10 offer for these entities for \$4.2 billion. The value of that asset -- again, 11 12 the value of the Funding Agreement is equal 13 to the liability minus the assets of LTL. We 14 know there is no possible way that we would 15 think that the value of the liability 16 approached \$60 billion. 17 There was a cap on the liability, on the Funding Agreement, but the value of 18 19 that Funding Agreement, of course, would be what the liability was, and there -- no where 20 approached \$60 billion. 21 In fact, as you know what our position is, you know where -- it 22 23 doesn't approach \$30 billion. 24 So, you know, I think the best way 25 to think about the value of that asset was --

88 1 J. KIM 2 what the position -- and as evidenced -- as 3 laid out in the omnibus objection is -- you 4 know, the position of Johnson & Johnson was 5 that the agreement was unenforceable. 6 was the position they took. 7 So, again, I refer to the objection and -- about what the positions of 8 9 the parties were. 10 Q. Mr. Kim, it's the case, is it not, that LTL wanted to be in financial distress 11 12 after it signed the second Funding Agreement? 13 MR. JONES: Object to the form 14 of the question. 15 Α. Yeah, I would say LTL was clearly 16 in financial distress. And, frankly, it was clearly in financial distress after the Third 17 Circuit's decision made the -- made the J&J 18 19 backstop unenforceable. That's what caused 20 the financial distress. 21 The second funding agreements are 22 a way to try to deal with that unenforceability issue, but it's still 23 24 remained in financial distress. But the financial distress was caused by the talc 25

109 1 J. KIM 2 The summary would be that after 3 the Third Circuit's decision and rendered the 4 2021 Funding Agreement unenforceable, when we 5 entered into the new agreements, the primary 6 obligor under the Funding Agreement was 7 HoldCo. And while HoldCo has sufficient 8 assets so that the LTL is not rendered 9 10 insolvent by the talc liabilities, in order to deal with the talc liabilities, well, we 11 12 believe that HoldCo would be financially distressed, and, therefore, LTL would be 13 financially distressed because HoldCo's 14 15 assets are not as liquid. 16 And that because of the liquidity issues, it would have to sell the assets and 17 substantially impair its business in order to 18 19 pay, under the Funding Agreement, the 20 obligations related to the talc liabilities. 21 So that, in a nutshell, renders 22 LTL and HoldCo financially distressed. 23 Q. So let me just try and Okay. break that down a little bit. 24 25 Under the second Funding

214 1 J. KIM 2 does LTL have sufficient funding to manage 3 its talc liabilities in the tort system for 4 the next ten years? 5 Again, I'm not sure. Α. Putting 6 these -- so as you go out in time, because of the volatility and the variability of the 7 costs, aberrant verdicts settlements, I think 8 you would come closer and closer to reaching 9 10 the limit, but we believe that LTL and HoldCo's assets are sufficient to fund the 11 12 talc liability period. 13 In the tort system? Q. 14 Yeah, in the tort -- outside of Α. 15 bankruptcy. 16 But, again, there are liquidity 17 issues with respect to -- with respect to 18 that. 19 Ο. And those liquidity issues are 20 created by the Funding Agreement reached 21 between LTL and HoldCo, correct? 22 I disagree with that. Liquidity 23 issues are created by the talc litigation and 24 whatever assets HoldCo, which was the 25 original old JJCI, of course, have.